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In this study I analyze the pattern of adoption of natural gas in Chile and the drivers behind it. 
For doing that I have a panel data set of stationary sources from 1995 to 2005 that allows me 
to identify either the role of environmental policy as the impact of the energy cost inducing the 
switching to this clean fuel. Besides, I evaluate the performance of the system of environmental 
contingencies, a non- traditional policy instrument created in Chile in the early nineties, that 
seemed strongly correlated with the switching. According to the data most of the adoption 
of natural gas was induced by the lower cost of this fuel, showing that sources were more 
sensitive to the cost of energy than to the environmental regulation. 
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In many large cities in developing countries, increased population and economic development 
have brought with them increased levels of air pollution. Facing the growing problem of 
deteriorated air quality, policy makers have to decide what kind of regulatory instruments to use. 
The successful experience with economic instruments in some developed countries has led many 
analysts to propose the use of these policies in the developing world. While some analysts are 
skeptical about the use of market-based policies in the developing world, others have focused 
their attention on specific policies, discussing the advantages and disadvantages of various 
economic instruments. 
 
Market advocates argue that this approach allows developing countries to more readily 
accommodate economic growth while decentralizing decision making for control options, 
providing greater incentives for technological change and lowering overall compliance costs. 
“Market skeptics” emphasize that developing countries lack of the experience, institutions, and 
resources necessary to design and operate economic instruments effectively (see Bell and Russell 
2002; Bell 2004). Some market advocates argue that design deficiencies and pervasive 
constraints on monitoring and enforcement can affect the performance of both economic 
policies, command, and command and control policies, although the implementation of more 
sophisticated policy instruments, such as tradable emission permits,  would require major 
institutional changes. Emissions fees might then more appropriate since they can provide 
foundation for a transition to an effective economic incentive system and raise revenue for 
environmental projects and programs (see Eskeland et al. 1992; Krupnick 1997; Blackman and 
Harrington 2000). Finally, those in favor of trading approaches argue that, as countries develop 
and economies and political systems become more willing to impose real environmental 
requirements, trading programs will become more adequate. Then, the important point is to start 
developing the institutions now that will build over the coming years (see Krueger 2003). 
 
However, in spite of the extensive ongoing debate about these issues, experience with 
environmental policies is not very large or deep, and there is little empirical evidence about the 
performance of environmental regulations in less developed countries. This paper is an attempt 
to contribute to this discussion and disentangle the role of environmental regulations and market 
forces behind a major air quality improvement in Santiago, Chile.  
 
Santiago is one of the most polluted cities in Latin America. During the early 1990s, it was 
officially declared a non-attainment zone for several atmospheric pollutants. However, during 
the late 1990s, there was major improvement due to a switch to natural gas by stationary sources. 
The switch allowed stationary sources to reduce particulate matter emissions, the pollutant which 
produces the worst health effects, by about 67 percent. The process of switching coincided with 
major new policy initiatives designed to improve air quality, including both command and 
control and market-based policies. But, it also coincided with the increased availability and 
reduced price of natural gas. 
 
 
What was responsible for the switch to natural gas in Santiago- environmental regulations, 
market forces, or both? In this study, I used a panel data set of stationary sources to identify the 
impact of environmental policies on energy cost savings and its inducement to switch to cleaner 
gas as fuel. 
 
The extent to which the environmental policy successfully improved the air quality in Santiago is 
policy relevant. It allows us to understand how regulations can provide incentives to make 
environmentally friendly decisions in less developed countries, to learn how regulators can 
engineer this feat, and be sensitive to the constraints they face in the process. It also helps us 
understand whether regulations can trigger technological innovations than can be profitable to 
firms and benefit the environment. 
 
Since the effect of environmental policies on the development and spread of new technologies is 
among the most important determinants of success of environmental protection efforts in the 
long run, analyzing the link between the choice of policy instruments and technological change 
has been the subject of considerable theoretical work. However, there has been exceptionally 
little empirical analysis. Most studies focus on the effects of alternative policy instruments on the 
innovation of energy-efficiency technologies because data have been more available. Greene 
(1990), for example, tested the effectiveness of CAFE1 standards and gasoline prices in new-car 
fuel economy, concluding that both were significant, although CAFE standards were much more 
influential on gasoline prices. On the other hand, Newell et al. (1999) analyzed the effects of 
increasing energy prices and raising government standards on the energy efficiency of air 
conditioners and gas water heaters, finding that both energy prices and government standards 
affected the energy efficiency. 
 
Kerr and Newell (2000) assessed the effects of the tradable permit program implemented to 
phase out lead in gasoline in the United States during the 1980s. They found that the tradable 
permit program provided incentives for more efficient technology-adoption decisions, as 
evidenced by a significant divergence in the adoption behavior of refineries with low versus high 
compliance costs. In other words, the positive differential in the adoption propensity of expected 
permit sellers (low adoption-cost refineries) relative to expected permit buyers (high adoption-
cost refineries) was significantly greater under tradable permits, compared to individually 
binding performance standards.  
 
In line with this result, Keohane (2001) found that the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program 
initiated under the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 also provided incentives for more 
efficient technology-adoption decisions. In particular, he found that the choice of whether or not 
to adopt a “scrubber” to remove sulfur dioxide, rather than purchasing more costly low-sulfur 
coal, was more sensitive to cost differences under the tradable permit than under the earlier 
emission standards.  
 
Previous studies analyzing the performance of the Chilean tradable permit program include 
Montero et al. (2002), O’Ryan (2002), Palacios et al. (2005), and Coria and Sterner (2008). 
                                                 
1 CAFE standards were created in 1978 with the purpose of reducing energy consumption by increasing the fuel 





Montero et al. (2002) highlighted the role of the grandfathered allocation which encouraged 
incumbent sources to more readily declare their emissions. O’Ryan (2002) emphasized the role 
of natural gas in decreasing the cost of emission abatement and reducing the efficiency gains 
from using a tradable permit program. Palacios et al. (2005) reviewed monitoring and 
enforcement, concluding that noncompliance by some sources coexists with an aggregated level 
of over-compliance. Finally, Coria and Sterner (2008) looked closely at the program’s 
performance over the past 10 years, stressing its discrepancies with successful trading programs 
implemented in developed countries and analyzing how it has reacted to regulatory adjustments 
and market shocks. 
 
What can we learn from Santiago’s experience? Basically, that when it is time to undertake 
technological change, firms are quite responsive to changes in relative prices. Thereby, there is 
room for environmental policies in less developed countries to modify relative prices for the sake 
of promoting environmental targets. However, the institutional context is actually a key element 
explaining differences in the output of environmental regulations between developed and 
emerging countries and, as argued by marked advocates, these constraints affect the performance 





Chilean Environmental Regulation 
 
During the early 1990s, 20 percent of total emissions of particulate matter (PM10) in Santiago 
came from stationary sources. Industrial boilers and industrial processes were the largest emitters 
(47 percent and 46 percent, respectively), with a small contribution coming from residential 
boilers and bakery ovens (6 percent and 1 percent, respectively). Three major environmental 
policies were implemented to control their emissions:  a cap and trade program, a concentration 
standard, and a contingency program. 
 
The cap and trade program was implemented in 1992 by Supreme Decree 4 (SD 4), although it 
started in practice in 1997. It affected emissions coming from large boilers (both industrial and 
residential), which discharged emissions through a duct or stack with a maximum flow rate 
higher than 1000 m3/hour.  
 
SD 4 established an individual cap on the emissions of large boilers and a tradable permit 
program that allowed them to exceed this cap through offsetting their emissions with other, less 
polluting large boilers. For the purpose of granting permits, it differentiated between existing and 
new large boilers. Existing boilers were those installed or approved before 1992 and were 
granted emission permits. New large boilers were required to offset their emissions fully through 
the emissions abatement of existing large boilers. 
 
Initially, the daily cap on emissions of existing large boilers was calculated according to a 
formula that allowed them to emit a maximum derived from a target on emissions concentration 
equal to 56*10-6(kg/m3) times the maximum flow rate (m³/hr) of the gas in the stack times 24 






    Daily Emissions (kg/day) = Flow Rate (m³/hr)* 56*10-6(kg/m3)*24(hours/day)  (1) 
 
However, as the program continued, the environmental authority realized that its initial 
allocation was too generous. They modified the quantity of allowable emissions for existing 
large boilers by decreasing the target on emission concentration to 50*10-6(kg/m3) in 2000 and to 
32*10-6(kg/m3) in 2005. The offsetting rate, that is, the number of permits sources need to buy in 
order to emit 1 kg of particulate matter, was also modified. Initially, it was set at 1. In 1998 it 
was increased to 1.2, and in 2000 it was increased to 1.5. 
 
For the rest of the stationary sources, SD 4 established a standard for allowable emissions 
concentration equal to 56*10-6(kg/m3), which was reduced to 32*10-6(kg/m3) in 2005. 
 
Table 1 summarizes some statistics about the tradable permit program from 1997 to 2005. The 
summary contains information about the number of sources in the program, the initial allocation 
of permits, aggregate emissions, aggregate permits in force, and the offsetting of permits. 
 
Table N° 1: Tradable Permit Program 
 
Variable 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of sources 593 583 516 534 495 513 521 526 519
Existing sources 430 402 332 324 286 277 273 264 251
New sources 163 181 184 210 209 236 248 262 268
Permits in force (kg/day) 4045.40 4044.40 4054.56 3710.37 3680.43 3087.34 2944.86 2856.05 2315.87
Initial daily emissions (IDE) 4045.40 3963.36 3672.76 3195.08 2981.53 2162.52 1897.75 1746.98 1123.49
Daily permitted emissions (DPE) 0 81.04 381.80 515.29 698.90 924.82 1047.11 1109.07 1192.38
Aggregate emissions (kg/day) 2544.79 1804.60 865.75 824.55 650.21 603.59 649.76 624.33 688.51
Existing sources 1684.27 1214.04 622.29 599.92 465.75 439.43 404.40 445.87 498.61
New sources 860.52 590.56 243.46 224.63 184.46 164.16 245.36 178.46 189.90
Excess of Permits (a) 1500.61 2239.80 3188.81 2885.81 3030.22 2483.75 2295.10 2231.72 1627.36
Existing sources 2361.13 2749.32 3050.47 2595.15 2515.78 1723.09 1493.35 1301.11 624.88
New sources -860.52 -509.52 138.34 290.66 514.44 760.66 801.75 930.61 1002.48
(a) Excess of permits corresponds to the difference between the permits in force and the aggregate emissions 
Source: Elaborated from PROCEFF databases
 
 
At the beginning of 1997, 4045.40 kilograms of emitted particulate matter were allocated among 
430 existing sources. Currently, only 53.7 percent of the initial mass of permits remains in force 
and 60 percent is in the hands of new large boilers. Notice that although the aggregate cap on 
emissions was accomplished from the beginning, new sources did not offset their emissions 
during the first years of the program. Montero et al. (2002) argued that one of the reasons behind 





permits could be allocated, it was necessary to develop a comprehensive inventory of sources 
and their historical emissions. Because of limited resources, the regulator concentrated its 
regulatory activity on the completion of the inventory and the allocation of permits. As 
consequence, the regulator did not track trading activity until the process was completed, so there 
was no reconciliation of permits and emissions until the market began to take off at the end of 
1998. 
 
The daily cap on emissions implicit in the equation (1) weight far overestimated real emissions 
from existing large boilers, producing an excess of permits in force since the beginning of the 
program that has been intensified because of the switch to cleaner fuels. According to Coria and 
Sterner (2008), this excess number of permits in force has prevented the market from fully 
developing, in the sense that many sources rely on autarkic compliance instead of participating in 
the permits market. 
 
Supreme Decree 32 (1990) implemented a contingency program to control emissions from all 
stationary sources, during declared states of “environmental contingencies” of bad air quality. 
These episodes occur when an environmental quality index reaches high values.2 If the index 
reaches a value over 300, a “pre-emergency” episode is declared. If it reaches a value over 500, 
an “emergency” episode is declared. Every year, the environmental authority prepares the 
contingency lists. Sources on the pre-emergency list must shut down during a “pre-emergency” 
episode, while sources on in the emergency list must shut down during an “emergency” episode. 
 
To construct the lists, sources are ordered according to their PM10-emission concentration. The 
source with the highest PM10 concentration is at the top of the list, and the source with the lowest 
PM10 concentration is at the bottom. From 1998 to 2000, those sources exhibiting the higher 
PM10 concentration—and held responsible for 30 percent of the total mass emissions—were 
included in the pre-emergency list while those held responsible for 50 percent of the total mass 
of emissions were included in the emergency list. In 2001 the regulation was redefined in terms 
of absolute pollution. The authorities established a new threshold of    32*10-6(kg/m3) and  
28*10-6(kg/m3) of PM10-emission concentration to shut down the sources during pre-emergencies 
and emergencies, respectively. 
 
Table 2 shows some information about critical episodes and the number of sources included in 
the lists. As critical episodes have not been rare, sources have tried to avoid being included in the 
contingency lists. However, the criterion used until 2000 implied that, because some sources 
took steps to reduce pollution, it became increasingly difficult for the rest to avoid being 
included. Therefore, the number of sources in the lists increased as the concentration threshold 
decreased abruptly. The criterion was modified in 2001 and the number of sources in the pre-
emergency list started to decrease, while the number of sources in the emergency list stayed the 
same for the most part. 
 
                                                 
2 The environmental authority measures the levels of PM10 per hour in a set of monitoring stations. The measuring is 





Table N° 2: Contingency Program 
 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Days in Pre-Emergency 13 12 14 11 4 11 5 2 2
Number of Sources in the List 141 230 1007 1176 521 336 359 178 155
Pre-Emergency Concentration 
Threshold (10-6 Kg/m3) 92.9 77 35.4 30.1 32 32 32 32 3
Industrial Boilers 63.83% 47.39% 18.77% 19.64% 17.85% 21.43% 14.76% 8.99% 11.61%
Residential Boilers 16.31% 26.09% 54.42% 62.50% 58.73% 53.87% 42.34% 5.06% 3.23%
Bakery Ovens 0.00% 4.78% 12.91% 4.85% 4.22% 8.04% 7.24% 0.00% 0.00%
Industrial Processes 19.86% 21.74% 13.90% 13.01% 19.19% 16.67% 35.65% 85.96% 85.16%
Days in Emergency 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of Sources in the List 421 887 2619 2483 1657 1472 1574 1584 1635
Emergency Concentration 
Threshold (10-6 Kg/m3) 63 50 28.9 22 28 28 28 28 2
Industrial Boilers 57.24% 33.26% 15.43% 15.67% 12.55% 12.23% 10.80% 9.53% 12.42%
Residential Boilers 12.83% 39.57% 54.98% 45.63% 44.00% 38.25% 33.48% 29.29% 28.56%
Bakery Ovens 0.48% 4.96% 20.47% 27.18% 34.52% 42.05% 43.07% 46.91% 46.61%
Industrial Processes 29.45% 22.21% 9.13% 11.52% 8.93% 7.47% 12.64% 14.27% 12.42%
Sources in the Contingencies Lists
Sources in the Pre-Emergency List
Sources in the Emergency List






The relative importance of stationary sources within the lists changed from 1998 to 2005. During 
1997 and 1998, industrial boilers became the most affected group. Residential boilers became the 
most affected group after that, until 2003. On the other hand, bakery ovens have not been very 
affected by pre-emergencies, although their share on the emergency list has increased since 
1999. Finally, the relative importance of industrial processes increased from 2004 onwards. 
 
Given the fiscal and technical resources constraints, monitoring and enforcement activities were 
mostly focused on industrial boilers because of their relative importance in total emissions. 
During the last decade, industrial boilers were much more prone to be inspected than residential 
boilers and bakery ovens, as displayed in table 3. Although the number of sources inspected has 
increased over time, just a small fraction of residential boilers and bakery ovens was actually 
inspected from 2000 to 2003.3 
 
                                                 





Table N° 3: Proportion of Stationary Sources Inspected by Group 
 
Type of Source
2000 2001 2002 2003
Industrial Boilers 74.0% 73.8% 95.1% 96.8%
Residential Boilers 27.7% 30.7% 31.0% 51.7%
Bakery Ovens 30.16% 44.04% 23.14% 21.27%
Proportion of Stationary Sources Inspected by Group
Year
 
Source: Elaborated from data provided by PROCEFF  
 
 
Natural Gas Adoption, Environmental Policy and Fuel Prices 
 
The most popular way to meet the regulation was to switch to natural gas, a clean fuel available 
since 1997 and imported from Argentina by a private company, METROGAS. Natural gas was 
introduced through a gradually constructed network, heavily concentrated, between 1997 and 
1998. Even its introduction to the whole city is yet not completed, although it is available in the 
most communes of Santiago. 
 
There are clear differences within the pattern of switching followed by stationary sources. Table 
4 shows the switching rate by boilers (distinguishing between the overall rate of switching by 
industrial and residential boilers and the rate of switching by large boilers within each group) and 
bakery ovens from 1998 to 2005. Unfortunately, there is no identification variable that allows 
observing industrial processes through time. Henceforth, industrial processes are excluded from 
the analysis. 
 













1998 612 4.7% 504 9.9% 1018 0.0% 79 9.9% 505 0.2%
1999 620 18.8% 442 25.4% 1225 1.7% 74 30.5% 613 0.7%
2000 660 24.7% 449 30.1% 1706 20.6% 85 37.5% 660 1.7%
2001 643 33.4% 414 42.3% 1809 41.8% 81 50.3% 860 5.7%
2002 644 39.6% 433 47.6% 1916 53.8% 80 59.0% 945 7.4%
2003 641 41.3% 446 52.0% 2011 57.7% 75 62.9% 1031 8.2%
2004 624 45.0% 451 56.1% 2109 61.7% 75 66.5% 1127 10.1%
2005 636 42.6% 445 52.8% 2890 58.8% 74 69.2% 1168 12.5%
Overall Large Boilers Overall Large Boilers Bakery Ovens
Source: Elaborated from data provided by PROCEFF and METROGAS
Year




Industrial boilers started to switch to natural gas earlier, while residential boilers began to switch 





exceeding industrial boilers at the end of the period. Within each group, large boilers switched 
earlier and the rate of switching slightly exceeded the overall rate at the end of the period. On the 
other hand, just 12.5 percent of the bakery ovens switched to natural gas and the rate of 
switching is very flat along the period. 
 
At a first sight, both environmental policies seem quite correlated with the switching process. 
First, large boilers started switching earlier, suggesting some facet of the tradable permit 
program encouraged this process. Second, the lag of the relative importance of stationary sources 
in the pre-emergency list is clearly correlated with their pattern of switching. The switching rate 
of industrial boilers took off between 1998 and 1999, after they became the group most affected 
by this policy. The same happened with residential boilers, which started to switch heavily in 
2000, while bakery ovens which were not very affected did not switch very much. However, 
since natural gas was the cheapest clean fuel available, there is also room for relative fuel prices 
being the main driver explaining the switching. In fact, in most cases, switching to natural gas 
reduced production costs because of the lower cost per unit of energy. Additionally, since 
natural-gas supplier METROGAS used a non-linear pricing scheme to offer volume discounts, 
switching was more profitable to large sources using more fuel. Table 5 shows some statistics 
about the relative fuel expenditure in 1998 for a sample of industrial boilers, residential boilers, 
and bakery ovens, and for a sample of fuels used previously for most stationary sources. 
 








Diesel N° 5 78* 20 0.69 0.60 0.60
Diesel N° 2 30 958 2.19 1.92 1.91
Kerosene 30 16 1.90 1.66 1.66
Liquidified Gas 15 99 2.32 2.03 2.03
City Gas 15 70 3.01 2.64 2.63
New Users** 15 1391 1.00 1.00 1.00
N 2554
* Estimated from a sample of sources using Diesel N° 5 in 1998
** New users that started operations burning natural gas
Source: Elaborated from data provided by PROCEFF and METROGAS
PM10 
Concentration
Fuel Expenditure and the Switching
N° of Sources 
that switched




For each previous fuel, the relative expenditure was calculated as the ratio between the 
expenditure in energy in 1998, using that fuel and the expenditure if it were burning natural gas. 
 
Even though the fuel expenditure using diesel #5 was lower, this fuel did not allow sources to 
meet the environmental regulation because of the high level of PM10 concentration it produced. 
Therefore, after its introduction, natural gas became the cheapest clean fuel available. The 
switching implied significant reductions in the fuel expenditure for most sources, although 






Next section introduces the methodology used to disentangle the role of environmental 





According to the Chilean environmental law, large boilers—producing an average level of output 
Xit higher than a threshold X — must compensate their emissions, trading permits at a price pt. 
Non-large boilers—producing an average level of output lower than a threshold X —must meet 
a concentration standard tδ . Finally, both large boilers and non-large boilers emitting more than 
a concentration threshold tα  were included in the contingency program and forced to shutdown 
during critical episodes that occurred with probability μt. 
 
Switching to natural gas not only helped sources decrease their level of emission but also offered 
several other benefits to sources. First, the lower level of emissions produced with this fuel, etNG, 
allowed large boilers to reduce the number of emission permits used, eti. Second, it allowed non-
large boilers to reach the concentration standard since their emissions concentration was lower 
than the threshold tδ  at any time. Third, it allowed all sources to leave the contingency program 
at any time their emissions concentration was lower than the threshold tα . Finally, it reduced the 
cost of required energy due to the differences in the market prices of gas. 
 
Let ztNG be the market price of the natural gas, zt be the vector of prices of the remaining fuels, r 
be the intertemporal discount rate, and WNG be the investment required to acquire the capital 
input necessary to burn natural gas. Let the variable PERMIT denote if the source was included 
in the trading program (taking a value equal to 1 for large boilers and zero otherwise) and dt to 
indicate if the source was included in the contingency program at the time t or not (taking a value 
equal to 1 if it was included and zero otherwise). Let the variable st  indicate whether a non-large 
boiler reached the concentration standard at time t or not (taking a value equal to 1 if it did not 
reach the standard and zero otherwise). Finally, let us assume that for a representative source the 
cost of being closed at the time t corresponds to Lt, while the cost of not reaching the 
concentration standard is Ft. 
 
Sources will switch to natural gas when the cost of delaying the switch equals the benefit. 
 
If, since each source is a profit maximizer, it chooses the date of adoption to fulfill the following, 
then, the following arbitrage condition must hold:   
 
* *( ) (1 )* * * * ( ) *i NG i i NG Nt t t t t t t t t t tpermit p e e permit s F d L X z z r Wμ− + − + + − =
G      (2) 
 
Thus, large boilers would switch to natural gas insofar as the expected benefit from avoiding the 
shutdown, plus any gain in the energy expenditure, plus any saving due to the reduction in the 
use of emission permits compensate the opportunity cost of the required investment. In the 





shutdown and the standard concentration plus the gains in the energy expenditure compensate 
the opportunity cost. 
 
A hazard model was indented to estimate how the variation of environmental regulations and 
fuel prices modified the decision to switch. For each firm, the hazard function is defined as the 
probability of switching to natural gas at time t, given that it has not switched yet. Formally: 
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where the behavior of the hazard function depends on the distributional assumptions for the 
cumulative distribution function ( , , )tF t x β  and probability density ( , , )tf t x β , as along the way 
the set of explanatory variables tx  changes over time. The parameters β can be estimated using 
maximum likelihood. 
 
In spite of the switch occurring in continuous time, spell lengths are observed only at intervals of 
a year. Unfortunately, the experiment is not long enough to assume a continuous approximation.4 
Thus, the two leading discrete distributions are explored—the logistic and the complementary 
log-log. The complementary log-log specification is a discrete representation of a continuous 
time–proportional hazard model while the logistic model was primarily developed for data that is 
intrinsically discrete. 
 
Both specifications separate the effects of explanatory variables on the hazard rate into two 
components:  a baseline hazard rate which is a function of time, c(t), and a function of the 
covariates β´ tx . Let z(t) = c(t)+β´ tx  be the hazard rate for a representative source in year t. 
Then, the shapes of the logistic and complementary log-log time hazard functions correspond to: 
 
1( , , ) [1 exp( ( ))]
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In both models, all differences between sources are assumed to be captured through the 
covariates. Regarding the choice of shape of the duration dependence specification c(t), the 
model estimated assumes a non-parametric baseline, creating duration interval–specific dummy 
variables, one for each spell year at risk. This approach was chosen because the accuracy of the 
estimator is better for shorter durations. Besides, this formulation allows the data to reflect any 
shock occurred in a particular year. This is quite relevant in the natural gas case, since Chile has 
faced restrictions over the quantity of gas that can be imported from Argentina since 2004. 
 
The dependent variable NATURALGASt indicates whether a source is using natural gas at each 
point in time within sample or not, having a value equal to 1 if the source is using natural gas at 
the time t and zero otherwise. The next two sections cover the covariates used to explain 
NATURALGASt.  
 
4 Kerr and Newell (2001) used data on 378 refineries over 25 years. Data used in this paper covers just over eight 






Independent Variables  
 
To capture the impact of environmental policies, the following variables are included: 
 
PERMIT: This is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the source is regulated 
through the tradable permit system and zero otherwise. Since large boilers could reduce the use 
of emission permits by switching, this coefficient is expected to be positive and statistically 
significant.5 
 
NUMBER OF SHUTDOWNSt-1:  To capture the impacts of critical episodes, the 
variable NUMBER OF SHUTDOWNSt-1 was included. It equals the number of days that the 
sources included on either in the pre-emergency or emergency list, or both, had to close during 
the previous year due to these regulations: 
 
NUMBER OF SHUTDOWNSt-1 = PRE-EMERGENCY t-1*NUMBER OF PRE- 
 
EMERGENCIES t-1  +  EMERGENCY t-1* NUMBER OF EMERGENCIES t-1           (5) 
 
The lagged value of the variable is used, since this should be the best guess available to sources 
deciding whether or not to switch to natural gas at the beginning of each interval at risk.6 More 
shutdowns increase the economic benefits from switching. Therefore, this coefficient is expected 
to be positive and statistically significant. 
 
The variables PERMIT and NUMBER OF SHUTDOWNSt-1 should pick up any effect that the 
tradable permit system and the contingency program had beyond the concentration standard. 
 
FUEL EXPENDITURE GAP-t:  Switching fuels affects production costs since each fuel 
entails a different per unit energy cost, either because of differences in fuel price or in the 
quantity required to generate the same level of production. In addition, METROGAS combines 
an average per cubic meter fee that decreases with volume with a fixed charge that increases with 
it. All these dimensions need to be included in the construction of a meaningful variable able to 
determine whether or not the cost advantages can explain the pattern of switching. Then, a 
relative expenditure variable was constructed, by source per year, considering the fuel the source 
was previously using. For any source previously using the fuel i, the relative expenditure at t 
corresponds to the ratio between the expenditure in energy using fuel i and the expenditure, if it 
were burning natural gas in that particular year, as it is detailed in the following formula: 
 
                                                 
5 To give account of the impacts of the tradable permit system, the variable DELTAEMISSONSt was also intended. It 
corresponds to the difference between the emissions produced by the fuel in use and the emissions produced by 
natural gas. However, the estimation results of the hazard model using such a variable did not change. 
6 The variables PRE-EMERGENCYt-1 and EMERGENCY t-1 were also intended. PRE-EMERGENCYt-1 was a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the source was included in the pre-emergency list the previous year and zero otherwise. 
EMERGENCYt-1 was a dummy variable equal to 1 if the source was included in the pre-emergency list the previous 
year and zero otherwise. The estimation results of the hazard model using such variables did not change. But 
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where Xi cubic meters of fuel i and XNG cubic meters are required to produce the same output. 
The expenditure in gas is equal to the price of that fuel for that level of consumption  
times the level of consumption plus the fixed charge, which also depends on the volume of 
natural gas used by the source .
( )NG NGt tz X
arg ( )NGt tFixedCh e X
7  Due to data limitations, the analysis 
focused on those sources previously using diesel #5, diesel #2, liquidified gas, kerosene, and city 
gas.  is expected to be positive and statistically significant. tFuelExpenditureGap
 
Control Variables  
 
SIZE: Bigger sources should switch faster due to the existence of scale economies. The 
variable FLOWRATEt is a proxy, since it is strongly correlated with the size of the combustion 
process. It is defined as the rate at which emissions are discharged through a duct or stack. 
However, it is also strongly correlated with the type of policy instrument, since those sources 
which discharge their emissions at a rate higher than 1000 m³/hour are regulated through the 
tradable permit program. To disentangle the effect of size from the regulatory effect, five 
FLOWRATEt dummy variables were created to reduce the correlation between both variables. 
The dummies are defined as follows:  FLOWRATE1t takes a value equal to 1 if the source 
discharged its emissions at a rate lower than 500 m³/hour and zero otherwise; FLOWRATE2t 
takes a value equal to 1 if the source discharged its emissions at a rate of 500–1200 m³/hour and 
zero otherwise; FLOWRATE3t takes a value equal to 1 if the rate varies between 1200 and 1900 
m³/hour and zero otherwise; FLOWRATE4t takes a value equal to 1 if the rate varies between 
1900 and 3500 m³/hour and zero otherwise. Finally, FLOWRATE5t takes a value of 1 if the rate 
is higher than 3500 m³/hour and zero otherwise. All these coefficients are expected to be positive 
and statistically significant. 
 
PREVIOUS CHANGE:  Those sources burning cleaner fuels face fewer regulatory 
restrictions than those using dirtier fuels. In addition, there could be opportunity costs created by 
the previous switch. Then, if a source switched to cleaner non-natural gas fuels at some point in 
the sample, it could be less prone to switching again since the benefit will be lower and the 
capital cost will be higher. The dummy variable PREVIOUS CHANGE takes account of this 
effect. It takes a value equal to 1 if the source switched to a cleaner non-natural gas fuel before 
the natural gas arrival and zero otherwise. This coefficient is expected to be negative and 
statistically significant. 
 
EQUIPMENT:  Sources could also reduce their emissions installing end-of-pipe 
technologies, such as filters, electrostatic precipitators, cyclones, or scrubbers. However, in the 
                                                 
7 In the data set, energy consumption is expressed in kilograms by hour. The consumption by month by source was 
determined by multiplying the original variable times the number of hours a source works everyday and times the 
number of days that it works every month. Then, it was transformed into square meters (m³) of fuel divided by the 






sample, this was a very unusual alternative. The dummy variable EQUIPMENT is included to 
capture any effect that the availability of abatement technologies could have on the switching 
probability. 
 
BAKERY OVENS EFFECT:  The main reason to include this variable is to capture the 
role of the Association of Bakery Owners, INDUPAN, which encouraged its members to switch 
to light oil. At the beginning of the 1990s, INDUPAN started to promote switching from wood to 
diesel #2. To support this, INDUPAN signed agreements with suppliers of the technology 
required to burn light oil and with a light oil company (Shell), offering discounted prices to its 
members. These measures were not offered again to promote the switch to natural gas. Thus, this 




Data employed was recorded by the Point Sources Emission Control Program (PROCEFF) and 
includes information from more than 5,000 sources from industrial boilers, residential boilers, 
and bakery ovens over 11 years (1995–2005). 
 
The standard procedure to estimate discrete hazard models required re-organizing the data set so 
that for each source there were as many rows as there were intervals at risk of the event 
occurring for each source. Then, the panel was turned from one row of data per source to another 
in which each source contributed Ti rows, where Ti is the number of years i was at risk of 
switching. Ti is denoted as STUDY TIMEi. For a source that switched to natural gas, STUDY 
TIMEi corresponds to the time until the switch. If a source never switched, it corresponds to the 
time the source survived in the experiment. However, it cannot be expected that sources switch 
to natural gas if this fuel was not available. Thus, the number of years at risk of sources 
switching, that were located in communes where natural gas was available after 1998, starts to be 
considered from the date at which natural gas entered that commune.8 
 
Table 6 presents summary statistics of the covariates for the whole sample and table 7 presents 
summary statistics for industrial boilers, residential boilers, bakery ovens, and sub-samples of 
sources that switched and did not switch to natural gas. 
 
As it can be seen in table 6, the tradable system program seems strongly correlated with the 
switching of industrial boilers, but it is not correlated with the switching of residential boilers. In 
any sub-sample, there is a positive correlation between the lag of the number of shutdowns and 
the switch, and between the fuel expenditure gap and the switch. 
 
                                                 
8 Consider the case of a source that existed in 1998, but only had gas available in 2000 and switched to gas in 2003. 





Table N ° 6: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable N° Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
NGt 19618 0.105 0.307 0 1 
Permit 19618 0.117 0.321 0 1 
N° of Shutdownst-1 15284 1.964 4.321 0 15 
Fuel Expenditure Gapt 16966 1.918 0.468 0.5 3.6 
FlowRate1t 19618 0.717 0.450 0 1 
FlowRate2t 19618 0.200 0.399 0 1 
FlowRate3t 19618 0.033 0.179 0 1 
FlowRate4t 19618 0.032 0.177 0 1 
FlowRate5t  19618 0.018 0.133 1 1 
Previous Change  19618 0.194 0.394 0 1 
Equipmentt 19618 0.012 0.106 0 1 
Industrial Boilers 19930 0.232 0.426 0 1 
Residential Boilers 19930 0.488 0.499 0 1 
Bakery Ovens 19930 0.280 0.448 0 1 
     
Baseline      
Dummy1998 19618 0.095 0.294 0 1 
Dummy1999 19618 0.110 0.327 0 1 
Dummy2000 19618 0.140 0.348 0 1 
Dummy2001 19618 0.132 0.339 0 1 
Dummy2002 19618 0.130 0.337 0 1 
Dummy2003 19618 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Dummy2004 19618 0.123 0.329 0 1 
Dummy2005 19618 0.151 0.358 0 1 
      









Table N° 7: Summary Statistics by Sub Samples 
 











 Mean Mean Mean 
NGt 0.0687 0.184 0.0260 
Permit 0.608 0.316 0.046 0.073   
N° of Shutdownst-1 1.950 1.899 3.400 2.558 1.282 0.700 
Fuel Expenditure Gapt 2.140 2.012 1.954 1.830 2.041 1.906 
FlowRate1t 0.163 0.445 0.705 0.763 0.958 0.933 
FlowRate2t 0.335 0.322 0.274 0.189 0.022 0.064 
FlowRate3t 0.164 0.095 0.007 0.020 0.012 0.001 
FlowRate4t 0.200 0.088 0.010 0.017 0.006 0.000 
FlowRate5t  0.135 0.048 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000 
Previous Change  0.140 0.369 0.014 0.138 0.019 0.258 
Equipmentt 0.018 0.014 0.004 0.003 0.019 0.021 
       
Baseline       
Dummy1998 0.261 0.098 0.114 0.081 0.118 0.073 
Dummy1999 0.232 0.108 0.148 0.089 0.128 0.090 
Dummy2000 0.181 0.122 0.232 0.119 0.182 0.114 
Dummy2001 0.142 0.126 0.164 0.124 0.163 0.123 
Dummy2002 0.079 0.134 0.099 0.138 0.128 0.146 
Dummy2003 0.044 0.128 0.056 0.130 0.092 0.133 
Dummy2004 0.029 0.135 0.042 0.144 0.112 0.156 
Dummy2005 0.028 0.145 0.142 0.171 0.073 0.160 
       






Table 8 displays the results under the complementary log-log specification. However, the results 
are robust to various distributional assumptions. The results reported are not the estimated values 
of the coefficients, but rather the exponentiated coefficients. An exponentiated coefficient greater 
than 1.0 indicates than an increase in the covariate increases the baseline hazard. On the contrary, 







Table N ° 8: Switching Results 
 
Switching Results 
Variable Hazard Rates with p 




N° of Shutdownst-1 1.09 
(0.29) 
0.15% 















Previous Change  0.27 
(0.00)* 
-7.06%* 
Equipmentt 1.47 (0.23) 4.32% 
Bakery Ovens 0.21 
(0.00)* 
-7.65%* 
Year 1999 1.14 
(0.25) 
1.28% 
Year 2000 1.12 
(0.34) 
1.16% 
Year 2001 1.10 (0.47) 0.91% 
Year 2002 0.64 
(0.00)* 
-3.38%* 
Year 2003 0.31 
(0.00)* 
-6.67%* 
Year 2004 0.21 
(0.00)* 
-7.67%* 
Year 2005 0.02 (0.00)* 
-9.59* 
   
Mean Probability of 
Switching 
 9.82% 
N 14724  
Log Likelihood -2616.31  
*   significant at 1% 
**  significant at 5% 







The marginal effects are also reported. The mean probability of switching is equal to 9.82 
percent, and it is obtained when all continuous variables are evaluated at their mean and the 
dummy variables are equal to zero. Then, the marginal effect of each dummy variable is obtained 
as the difference between the probability obtained when that variable takes a value equal to 1 and 
the mean probability of switching. For continuous variables, the marginal effect is calculated as 
the impact on the mean probability of increasing them by 10 percent. 
 
PERMIT and NUMBER OF SHUTDOWNSt-1 have the expected signs, although surprisingly, 
none affects the likelihood of switching statistically. On the opposite, FUEL EXPENDITURE 
GAPt is positive and statistically significant, suggesting the existence of important cost 
advantages of switching to natural gas. 
 
The estimations show that the bigger sources (FLOWRATE3t, FLOWRATE4t and FLOWRATE5t) 
were more likely to switch to natural gas. On the contrary, to have switched to another cleaner 
non-natural gas fuel (PREVIOUS CHANGE) decreases the probability of change. In the 
meantime, to have abatement equipment (EQUIPMENT) at one’s disposal affects the switching 
probability positively but not significantly. 
 
The results are consistent with a significant fixed effect that indicates that being a bakery oven 
decreases the probability of switching. This suggest that regardless of the rest of the variables 
considered in the analysis, bakery ovens switched less, probably because of the incentives 
granted by INDUPAN. 
 
The results also indicate that from 2002 onwards the stationary sources began to switch at a 
lower rate. One possible explanation for this is that the dummies captured some sort of vintage 
effect. Since the sources that did not switch (probably since they did not see enough benefits 
from the switch) are those that remained in the sample longer, the negative coefficients show that 
each year the adoption was less probable for them. This situation can also be related to the 
natural gas crisis that began in 2004 due to the restrictions imposed by the Argentine government 
on the quantity of gas that could be imported by Chile. Clearly, the crisis reduced the incentives 
to switch, given the uncertainty about its availability. 
 
Regarding the marginal effects of the statistically significant variables, a 10-percent increase of 
the fuel expenditure raised the mean probability by 2.59 percent. Considering that the price of 
natural gas was almost half the price of all other clean fuels, this implied a total effect equal to 
25.9 percent. Not having changed to a cleaner non-natural gas fuel before decreased the mean 
probability by almost 7 percent, while being a bakery oven reduced the mean probability by 7.65 
percent. Size also affected the mean probability significantly. In fact, belonging to the biggest 
sources (FLOWRATE5t) increased this probability almost 24 percent. Finally, from 2002 on, the 
mean probability of switching started to decrease significantly.  
 
 The model was also estimated by sub-samples of industrial boilers, residential boilers, and 
bakery ovens. Table 9 displays the results. Although most of them remain the same, an important 
difference is the significance of the environmental regulation. While the effects of the tradable 
permit program remained insignificant for both types of boilers, the contingency program did 





is very small. A 10-percent increase in the number of days that an industrial boiler had to 
shutdown the previous year increased the mean probability of switching by just 0.36 percent 
 
In spite of its magnitude, the previous result suggests the existence of differences in the impact 
of the number of shutdowns, either due to differences in the cost of being closed or differences in 
the probability of being closed.9 With regards to the last point, in the analysis about the 
switching decision, it is assumed that the probability of being closed during a bad quality episode 
is equal to 1. However, if sources are not forced to shutdown, the economic incentives of the 
regulation disappear. The results seem to support such an idea. The lack of effect of the 
contingency program for some stationary sources appears to be strongly related to the lack of 
monitoring efforts. In fact, as it can be seen in table 3, the probability of being inspected varied a 
lot across stationary sources and across years. While it was never lower than 70 percent for 
industrial sources, it decreased approximately to 20 percent for the rest, given that residential 
boilers were more prone to be inspected than bakery ovens. Unfortunately, data to test such a 
hypothesis more carefully it is not available. 
                                                
 
Again, there is an important role played by the lower price of natural gas to encourage the 
switch. Its impact is much more significant for industrial boilers, as it increased the mean 
probability by 38.5 percent, instead of 21.3 percent and 5.4 percent for residential boilers and 
bakery ovens, respectively. 
 
The effect of size is also more important for industrial boilers. Belonging to the group of the 
biggest industrial boilers (FLOWRATE5t) increased the switching probability by 34.11 percent. 
In the meantime, belonging to the group of the biggest bakery ovens (FLOWRATE3t) increased 
the switching probability by 22.69 percent. Residential boilers seem to have switched at the same 
rate, regardless of size. 
 
The effect of a previous switch is higher for residential boilers, accounting for a 6.14-percent 
decrease in the probability of switching. Finally, the results by sub-samples show a significant 
decrease in the switching rate of all sources from 2003 on, probably reflecting the natural gas 
crisis, and from 2000 on for industrial boilers, which may be related to the vintage effect 
suggested previously. 
 
However, the question remains:  why did the tradable permit system not encourage the switching 
to natural gas? According to the previous results, the tradable permit program did not affect the 
probability of switching to natural gas. However, as it is quite difficult to disentangle the impacts 
of the tradable permit program from the size, I looked for another way to identify the effect of 
tradable permit program. For that, the hazard model was estimated for the sub-sample of sources 
that had to fully offset their emissions. These sources corresponded to new large boilers that 
began operations after Supreme Decree 4 was enacted and did not receive emission permits. 
Consequently, they needed to fully offset their emissions buying emission permits from the 
existing large boilers. Since the variable PERMIT captures the benefits of reducing the use of 
 
9 In a series of interviews, PROCEFF’s workers mentioned that residential boilers could avoid the cost of the 
shutdowns by moving the combustion process to the night previous to the start of the shutdown. So, even though 
residential boilers were significantly affected by contingencies, the benefits of avoiding shutdowns were not enough 





emission permits, this coefficient is expected to be positive and statistically significant when 
only the sub sample of new large boilers is considered. 
 
Table N° 9: Switching Results for Sub Samples 
 











































































0.71%   














































































-7.60%   
    
Mean probability  
of switching 5.91% 7.64% 3.12% 
N 3208 6771 3932 
Log Likelihood -636.67 -1673.3 -236.85 
*   significant at 1% 
**  significant at 5% 
*** significant at 10% 







Table 10 shows the results, differentiating between industrial and residential boilers. As can be 
seen even in this case, the results remain the same, showing that there was not a statistically 
significant effect of the tradable permit program speeding up the switch to natural gas and that 
the main driver of the switch was the lower price of natural gas. 
 
Why did the tradable permit system not encourage the switching to natural gas? The reasons 
behind its lack of effect seem correlated with the implementation of the program. As was 
mention in section 3, since the environmental authority lacked good historical records on 
emissions by large boilers, they employed an allocation strategy that overestimated real 
emissions. Therefore, from the beginning of the program, emission permits in force have doubled 
the sources’s requirements, producing a very significant excess of supply in spite of regulatory 
changes that have reduced the stock. The aggregate excess of supply must have produced a very 
low permit price of equilibrium, making the benefits from reducing the use of emission permits [ 
 
insignificant when compared to the savings from fuel consumption. Unfortunately, there is no 
information about permit prices to verify this hypothesis more carefully. 
 
An additional explanation is provided by Palacios and Chávez (2005). According to the authors, 
the enforcement design used has not been able to induce high compliance levels because of a 
combination of monetary penalties that are not clearly defined and actual sanctions that are not 
automatically implemented but are decided on a case-by-case basis. As a consequence, the 
program has experienced individual violations from the beginning, particularly by new large 







Table N° 10: Switching Results for the Sub Sample of Large Boilers that Had to Fully Offset 
Their Emissions 
 
 Switching Results  For The Subsample Of  Large Boilers That Had To 
Fully Offset Their Emissions 









































































   
N 2709 6698 
Log Likelihood -483.29 -1651.27 
   
*   significant at 1%. 
**  significant at 5%. 









There is a growing interest in the use of economic instruments to address environmental 
problems in developing countries. However, some authors have expressed skepticism based on 
the lack of experience and lack of institutions necessary to design and operate such policies. 
These constraints would prevent these instruments from being cost effective, creating doubts 
about the extent to which developing countries should eschew or give up command and control 
policies instead of relying on economic instruments. 
 
Regarding the use of different economic instruments, there is some agreement about the 
difficulty of easily replicating the successful experience of the United States with permit trading 
programs in developing countries. Instead, some authors have advised the use of emission fees. 
Since emission fees are politically feasible and provide valuable revenues to finance regulatory 
activity, they appear to be a more realistic and appropriate policy alternative. 
 
This paper contributes to this discussion by producing new evidence of the role of environmental 
regulations and market forces in a successful air-quality improvement program in a less 
developed country. The main finding is that the institutional context is actually a key element 
explaining environmental regulation’s outcomes. In the case under analysis, switching to natural 
gas was basically a response to changes in relative fuel prices, instead of the consequence of 
various environmental regulations involving both command and control and market-based 
policies.  
 
Why did the environmental regulation not work? There are many reasons to explain the poor 
performance of environmental policies:  the lack of reliable baseline data and the deficiencies in 
monitoring and enforcement and the design of the environmental policies.  
 
With regard to the lack of baseline data, the inventory of sources and emissions that PROCEFF 
had at the moment of implementation and distribution of permits was far from complete. As 
consequence, the program was not designed on the basis of sources’ actual emissions but on a 
proxy variable equal to the maximum emissions that a source could potentially emit in a given 
period of time and that far overestimated actual emissions. Grandfathering the permits prompted 
rent-seeking behavior that also increased the permits in force, since it created incentives for false 
reporting by sources which were not operating at the time the program was implemented—
although it allowed the regulator to more readily identify sources that are not in the original 
inventory (Montero et al. 2002, 273). The excess of permits in force has prevented the market 
from fully developing, in the sense that many sources rely on autarkic compliance instead of 
participating in the permits market.  
 
In the Chilean environmental policy, monetary penalties are not clearly defined and actual 
sanctions are decided on a case-by-case basis. They might include a note of violation, as well as 
widely variable lump-sum monetary sanctions and quite infrequent prohibition of a sources’ 
operation. As a consequence, monitoring and enforcement did not provide enough incentives for 
high degrees of compliance because of the legal inability to deal with them, once detected, and to 






The performance of environmental policies seems also quite correlated with the technical ability 
to detect violations. Santiago’s program relies on self-reporting by regulated sources with 
monitoring conducted once a year. Daily emissions are approximated as the product of emissions 
concentration (in mg/m3) times the maximum flow rate (in m3/hour) of the gas exiting sources’ 
stack times 24 hours of operation. By using this simpler monitoring procedure, the monitoring 
task was reduced to the measurement of few parameters, such as the source’s size and fuel type. 
However, the large number of stationary sources involved in environmental policies demands 
that considerable resources be devoted to this activity. Because of resources constraints, 
environmental authority has focused monitoring and enforcement efforts on the main emitters. 
As consequence, the results of this study show a small but positive impact of the contingencies 
program explaining the switching by this group. 
 
In spite of the small response by firms to environmental regulations, the large response to 
changes in relative prices suggests that there is room for the use of these policies, if institutional 
changes are implemented. In fact, the lower price of natural gas worked in practice as an 
environmental fee increasing the cost of using less clean fuels. The results show that it was very 
effective speeding up the switching process and improving the environmental quality. Why was 
it so effective? Because, different from environmental policies, it provided certain and 
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